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Can leaders be picked and if so, how?1
During the Second World War, this deceptively simple question 
caused a furore, with heated debates in Parliament and letters to 
the editor in most major newspapers; everyone from the clergy-
man to the schoolmaster weighed in on the subject.2 As well as 
those from these established professions, those working in the field 
of psychological science sought to have their voices heard on the 
matter: psychiatrists and psychologists argued that their study of 
human science gave them the expertise to help govern who was 
best suited to perform the role of leadership. After years of work-
ing in industrial management they made the case that their work 
had relevance for the British military. This case was eventually 
accepted, and psychological science was given a role in establish-
ing methods of selecting men for roles in conjunction with each of 
the armed forces. This chapter examines how emergent expertise 
in psychological science was forged in the armed forces, and how 
psychological scientists attempted to create a space for their exper-
tise, working within and without military systems of governance to 
shape scientific and non-scientific practices concerning leadership.
The psychologists and psychiatrists who worked with the mili-
tary would have to prove not only their specialised knowledge, but 
also its operative nature; knowledge had to be put to work and to 
be proved as useful to its patrons in order for it to become exper-
tise.3 In his analysis of the historical phenomenon of expertise, Eric 
Ash notes that Pierre-Paul Riquet, who came to be considered an 
early modern expert in canals, presumably had knowledge and 
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confidence in his abilities that pre-dated his proposal to construct 
a canal, but that ‘his expertise only became tangible – in effect real 
– once [he] had marshalled it into productive use in the monarch’s 
service’. As with the psychological scientists, is unclear at exactly 
what point they became ‘experts’ in governance, but by the end of 
the war, having seemingly delivered on their promises to control 
knowledge and innovate, they were clearly considered to fit this 
definition.4
Psychologists’ early claims to expertise faced resistance, though; 
in proposing to choose leaders ‘objectively’, based on their minds 
rather than their status, psychologists represented a threat to tradi-
tional, class-based systems, which were strongly represented in the 
military and, particularly, in the Army. Those who developed meth-
ods of allocating men to roles and to measuring and picking out 
leaders implicitly made a statement about who was most suitable 
to govern, and what form that governance should take. The battle 
that was played out between the traditionalists and the scientists in 
the military was a microcosm of that in British society more gener-
ally between those advocating for the preservation of conservative 
systems and those favouring a liberal meritocracy.
The military, particularly during a time of ‘total war’, also 
presented a microcosm in the sense that it offered unprecedented 
opportunities for those in the psychological sciences to experiment 
in a securely funded, ordered military ‘laboratory’ where exper-
iments might be conducted that held relevance for society as a 
whole. In most instances, psychologists’ collaborations with the 
military would last only until the conclusion of the war. However, 
groups such as the Tavistock would take lessons learned in wartime 
and apply them to society more broadly in the post-war period, 
where more slowly established links with industry would prove to 
have greater endurance, if not such vast scope and funding.
Governing work
From the turn of the century, attempts had been made to expand 
the boundaries of the psychological sciences from the study of 
the peripheral deviant, the insane, to the central matters of every-
day life such as matters of employment. The study of selection 
was approached from a number of psychological lineages.5 A brief 
examination of three institutions during the interwar period pre-
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sents a point of comparison for analysing how governance was 
shaped, the different paths that led to interaction with structures of 
governance and the subjects of their science.
Some, such as Sir Frederic C. Bartlett and his experimental 
psychology colleagues at Cambridge University, were academics 
associated with developing theoretical techniques, who preferred 
to pursue ‘pure’ experimental laboratory science. Before the First 
World War, Bartlett had worked at Cambridge under Charles S. 
Myers, who had secured the money for the first experimental psy-
chology laboratory in the country, and W.H.R. Rivers.6 Both of 
his seniors then went to work for the Royal Army Medical Corps, 
but Bartlett was unfit for military service and thus became ‘care-
taker’ of the laboratory, teaching and publishing on a number of 
topics, including The psychology of the soldier. In this text, Bartlett 
encouraged men to govern themselves as well as their subordinates, 
noting ‘that a leader should take trouble to know his own character 
and capacity, and understand clearly what it is that maintains his 
own authority over his men’.7 Bartlett’s statement about the bene-
fits to the leader of learning psychology reflected an understanding 
of psychological science as providing general laws, the learning of 
which could achieve self-improvement, a tradition dating back to 
the 1859 book Self-help.8
Following the war, Myers departed from Cambridge. Rivers 
returned ‘full of general schemes and activity’, but died suddenly 
in 1922, leaving Bartlett as the permanent custodian of the labora-
tory. He developed Rivers’ plans and contributed his own, growing 
the department into a respectable part of Cambridge University: a 
Chair of Experimental Psychology was established in 1931, and 
Bartlett had three lecturers assisting him by 1933.9 He was elected 
a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1932. Bartlett followed the estab-
lished paths legitimating science by engaging in experiments within 
an academic institution, publishing findings, achieving recognition 
from scientific governing bodies like the Royal Society and gener-
ally operating within the traditionalist structures of internal scien-
tific governance. After departing from Cambridge, Myers took an 
almost diametrically opposed approach to Bartlett’s; he established 
the National Institute of Industrial Psychology (NIIP), an organi-
sation oriented towards applying psychology in industry. Bartlett 
considered that ‘practical interests’ had diverted Myers ‘from what 
might have been a brilliant experimental career’.10
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State involvement in governing management in industry had 
begun at the end of the nineteenth century, with the passing of the 
Factory and Workshop Acts. The earliest regulations dealt with 
physical health and the ages of workers and their hours of work, 
but from 1901 legislation was ‘also directed against the evils of 
“sweating”’, condemned alike by ‘the best class of employers of 
labour and by social reformers’.11 This move against demanding 
hard work for low wages as well as towards providing a ‘healthy’ 
workplace presented opportunities for the psychological sciences 
to find a niche in industry, promoting rationalisation of manpower 
as an alternative method of ensuring output but meeting welfare 
requirements. Colonel E.G. Wace attempted to introduce simi-
lar scientific direction of manpower during the First World War, 
with limited success. Although he had the support of the Army, 
which put him in command of the new Directorate of Labour in 
1917, junior officers ‘could not resist the temptation to depart from 
strictly outline structures and schedules’.12
Increased scientific governance of the workplace was further 
promoted at the end of the First World War when, shortly after 
the dissolution of the Health of Munition Workers’ Committee 
in July 1918, the Home Office encouraged the Medical Research 
Committee (now Medical Research Council) and the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research to appoint the Industrial Fatigue 
Research Board.13 The NIIP ‘came into existence in 1921, partly 
in order to apply the principles set forth by the Industrial Health 
Research Board’ and in part to remedy the problems that Myers 
saw in society.14 It asserted its scientific credentials through some 
of the traditional society links, beginning with Myers’ procurement 
of industry contracts by giving lectures at the Royal Institution, 
where the science was targeted at its potential consumers. To cir-
cumvent the resistance that Wace had encountered, the NIIP more 
explicitly promoted the benefits of using its science to govern a 
workplace, aiming to ‘promote by systematic scientific methods a 
more effective application of human energy in occupational life and 
a correspondingly higher standard of comfort and welfare for the 
workers’.15
Members of the NIIP worked as consultants, their programme 
of work focusing upon vocational guidance, studies of tempera-
ment and motor ability and studies of influences upon occupational 
choices and efficiency.16 This work followed a tradition of studies 
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which looked at working through a mechanical metaphor; one 
proponent claimed, for instance, that ‘scientific management as 
applied to workmen moves with the smoothness of a well-oiled and 
perfected machine, in which each one performs his part with the 
accuracy of a mechanically and mathematically perfect tooth on a 
gear wheel, when it meshes with the teeth of another wheel in trans-
mitting power’.17 As this claim suggests, issues of power were built 
into this science, with self-governance informed by science seen as 
a positive step by some, who saw ‘qualities of individual character 
as key determinants of social possibility’ and therefore the ability 
to measure and manage character as liberating.18 Many people, 
adolescents particularly, sought out the NIIP’s vocational services. 
Others were critical of the transmission of power up towards 
owners and managers and away from an increasingly de-skilled 
workforce. Experiments comparing allocations of boys based on 
psychological methods with selection based on old management 
style ‘showed the clear superiority of the former’, with the scientific 
approach seeming to trump the ‘common sense’ knowledge of mas-
ters who had known the boys for some time.19 In this case, it was 
the middle management whose claimed expertise was usurped in 
favour of scientific governance.
Cambridge had its laboratory, the NIIP was in the workplace; 
but before the Second World War, the psychiatrists affiliated with 
the Tavistock Clinic remained in the clinic. Like the NIIP, the 
Tavistock Clinic was set up in 1920, as a response to social prob-
lems such as shell-shock, by neurologist Dr Hugh Crichton-Miller, 
who aimed to provide care to those of limited means. Although 
they were engaged in work with the National Council for Mental 
Hygiene (which aimed to focus on promoting well-being as well 
as curbing mental illness), psychiatrists found it more difficult 
than their psychological compatriots during the interwar period 
to expand beyond a perception of their work as associated with 
mental illness, deviancy and taboo. Psychologist Millais Culpin 
noted that few doctors would mention an interest in analysis ‘with-
out the verbal equivalent of spitting three times over the left shoul-
der, and even to speak about the revival of war memories carried 
the risk of being accused of advocating free fornication for every-
one’.20 The Tavistock Clinic initially had difficulty even in securing 
premises because of landlords’ fears that its would be dealing with 
‘wildly disturbed lunatics!’21 It had made efforts to obtain academic 
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recognition, but with limited success, and had problematic relations 
with the British Psycho-Analytical Society, the official body of its 
discipline, because of disagreements over how closely to follow 
Freud.22 In the 1930s, the Tavistock continued to primarily work 
with individuals and their problems, although it did embark on 
a methodological expansion, with funding and recognition from 
the Rockefeller Foundation, training medics and social workers in 
how to incorporate psychological techniques into their working 
practices.23
The psychological scientists thus complicate historian David 
Edgerton’s call for twentieth-century history of science to focus on 
‘regular work’ as opposed to outsiders, because even a single insti-
tution could operate both within and without government-funded 
hierarchies.24 Much of the work outside of academia was not 
published, either because of corporate sensitivity or patient confi-
dentiality, or because acquiring the relevant expertise was seen as 
requiring training or analysis. Yet links with established scientific 
bodies were utilised to lend legitimacy to work by establishing its 
scientific nature. Although pursuing different methods of doing so, 
the Cambridge laboratory, the NIIP and the Tavistock all claimed 
to investigate the underlying processes of the mind, and to pro-
duce from this a distillation of theory and the ability to quantify 
and potentially control; psychologists offered the armed forces the 
promise of fundamental knowledge that could help them to inno-
vate and improve their systems of governing men.25
Establishing collaborations and governing leadership
The academic laboratory, the factory and the clinic had become 
established as legitimate sites for the psychologists’ and psychia-
trists’ work during the interwar period; however, the relationship 
between the scientists and the military was far more turbulent. 
Dramatic and fast-paced change occurred over the course of the 
Second World War, during which each of these psychological insti-
tutions, with their differing approaches to matters of selection, 
developed a relationship with a branch of the British armed forces. 
Those who had taken the traditional route to scientific credibil-
ity via the academy, the Cambridge psychologists under Bartlett, 
worked with the force that attracted the highest grade of men, the 
Royal Air Force (RAF). The NIIP worked with the Royal Navy. 
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The Tavistock, which deviated from traditional measures and prac-
tices of scientific credibility, worked in association with the ‘hide-
bound’ British Army. The approaches deployed and the respective 
relationships of these institutes with the forces reveal the role of 
factors such as culture and social networks in shaping governance 
of science and governance by science.
Despite psychological scientists’ work in industry in the interwar 
period, their expertise was looked on with contempt by many. The 
matter of how and by whom men should be governed was lent 
a greater urgency by the tide of war; Blitzkrieg and the impres-
sive, rapid expansion and success of the Luftwaffe suggested that 
Germany was organising its men effectively, and that Britain, in 
retreat, was not. After the various collaborations with the military 
arms had been set in motion, the scientists developed methods of 
selection for their respective forces. The scientists’ own views of 
what governance should entail were illuminated through the cre-
ation of tests and theories, and the varying relationships that the 
different scientists negotiated with the military reflected their expe-
riences of science practices in the civil world.
Experimental psychologists of Cambridge and the RAF
Perhaps because the aeroplane was seen as such a modern and 
complex technology, selection was incorporated into the RAF ear-
lier than in any other force. The RAF had not pursued the aviation 
psychology developed during the First World War, and had no 
selection techniques beyond interviewing at the outbreak of the 
Second World War. By early 1940, however, tests were introduced 
under the supervision of the Cambridge University Psychology 
Department, where Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) person-
nel were trained to carry out the testing. Despite this early adop-
tion, Vernon and Parry noted, the introduction of selection in the 
RAF ‘was more gradual and less unified than in either the Army or 
Navy’.26
Psychological tests based upon ‘skills’ were perceived as oper-
ating in the domain of science, and proved to be uncontroversial. 
As early as the First World War publication The psychology of 
the soldier, Bartlett had noted that in the military ‘the groups with 
which we are concerned, in any case, all possess a firmly established 
and finely graded system of official leadership. They are already at 
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the stage at which leadership as an institution is able to take over 
some of the functions and authority of the leader as a person.’27 
He believed that whilst a knowledge of a man’s skill was useful, it 
was not crucial, as the institution had sufficient ability to govern 
its men: they would do as commanded by someone who repre-
sented the prestige of the RAF, so the role of individual leaders was 
less important. The results of the Second World War RAF intelli-
gence tests were ‘available for the guidance of board presidents, 
but no cut-off levels were laid down’, echoing the assumption that 
the institution was free to take or leave scientific guidance.28 In 
 addition to a fifteen-minute verbal intelligence test, there were a 
fifteen-minute mathematical test to establish educational level and 
two fifty-word essays to hint at expression and alertness to current 
affairs, although little emphasis was placed on this ‘subjective’ test. 
The short and simple ‘Bartlett Tests’ remained the selection proce-
dure for three years and were seen as helping to make the Service 
‘test-conscious’, if not achieving a better fit of men to roles in them-
selves.29 Interview remained the technique by which officers were 
chosen until Army War Office Selection Board (WOSB) methods 
were adopted in 1945.
Most work was instead focused on more physical aspects of 
selection: the problems of fatigue and how to use caffeine and 
amphetamines appropriately ‘according to the type of individual 
… in correct dosage the dull appeared somewhat brighter, the aver-
age was perceptibly enlivened, while the above average who was 
normally a “live wire” became “hay-wire” with frayed nerves’.30 
The work, like Bartlett’s pre-war work, was defined by the labo-
ratory and a type of psychology very closely linked with the more 
established expertise of biology. It focused largely upon the limits 
of men beyond which control was lost, rather than venturing to 
quantify the capabilities of men. By maintaining the appearance 
of producing objective science, Cambridge psychology was free of 
RAF interference; it remained contained within the scientific world 
rather than attempting to extend its boundaries to encompass gov-
erning the social world.
The NIIP and the Navy
With war on the horizon in 1939, and concerned that their work 
might be ignored by the forces it could benefit, the directors of the 
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NIIP and Tavistock collaborated in promoting their work in a letter 
offering their services to the War Office. In the spring of 1939, the 
state did not perceive a need or use for scientific governance of its 
troops, and the letter remained unanswered. It would be more than 
a year before NIIP and Tavistock expertise was put to use in mili-
tary selection.
Selection in the Royal Navy was introduced in 1941, with 
the establishment of the Senior Psychologists Department of the 
Admiralty. The primary task of this department was to assist 
with  the selection and allocation of recruits to technical roles. 
Although the Navy was able to reject four out of five applicants, 
failure rates for special jobs like torpedomen were high; difficulties 
with technology were used as a justification for applying scien-
tific management techniques. Most of the qualified personnel were 
civilians, with eight psychologists provided by the NIIP forming 
the core: psychologists ‘had no executive authority in the Royal 
Navy, but acted throughout as technical advisers [so] there was 
far less frustration than is common when Psychologists work … 
under non- professional direction’.31 This thus maintained a sepa-
ration between the military state and civilian science, although the 
application of work was carried out by the Women’s Royal Naval 
Service. As the small number of psychologists suggests, psycholog-
ical science provided policy and administrative guidance on how 
to govern, based on its scientific principles, as opposed to taking 
an active role in the process. Most of the testing staff , numbering 
300 at the peak period, had no scientific training before the war, 
so efforts were made to ensure that methods were ‘as simple and 
foolproof as possible in order to hand them over’.32 Selection was 
eventually expanded to involve support staff in depots, barracks, 
specialist schools and mechanics.
As with Bartlett and the RAF, the NIIP saw its role as ‘supplying 
the recruiters with factual information on the basis of which they 
could more effectively decide the suitability or otherwise of candi-
dates’.33 Tests included a biographical questionnaire ‘to bring out 
educational and occupational history, leisure interests and experi-
ence of leadership’, a non-verbal intelligence test, colour-blindness 
tests and an interview to detect recruits who might need to be 
referred for psychiatric examination.34 Again, no pass-mark was 
fixed, and the decision was left to those traditionally responsible 
for governing whether or not to act on the apparently objective 
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scientific information with which they were provided. A second 
round of tests involved further mechanical and mathematical com-
prehension and spatial-awareness tests, but also took great pains to 
provide information to recruits on roles via posters, photographs, 
bulletins, films and sometimes trade test pieces. A talk from a psy-
chologist emphasised to men ‘that it was up to every recruit to do 
the most difficult job of which he was capable, and not merely one 
which he thought would give him a pleasant time’, and emphasis 
was placed on the individual’s choice of role, echoing the ideal 
that management science was supposed to benefit those governed 
as much as those governing.35 In being provided a choice of role 
(albeit in conditions of conscription), men were given the opportu-
nity to opt-in and to see psychology as providing increased freedom 
and democracy.
To the NIIP, leadership was not only a quality desirable in actual 
leaders but was sought in everyone: ‘leadership experience was 
advantageous, not only among seamen and officer candidates, but 
in diverse employments … Scouts, members of Boys’ Brigade, and 
the like, and of organisations such as the A.T.C. and Sea Cadets 
showed similar superiority.’36 These measures of leadership, based 
on experience and involvement in established organisations, were 
notably similar to what the military already valued and sought, 
and therefore less threatening than measures of ‘potential’ that 
the Tavistock group would implement. However, by the end of 
the war, the NIIP was also looking to more radical meritocratic 
measures, noting that tests of aptitude were validated against qual-
ifications, not ‘skills on the job’, and hoping that the future would 
‘see the isolation and measurement of some of the special qualities 
possessed by successful officers and leaders of men, by executives 
and administrators, by teachers, research workers, salesmen, inter-
viewers, and so forth’.37
The Tavistock group and the Army
The Army had the biggest problems with allocation of personnel, 
because it had the least governance over who entered its force; 
unlike the RAF and Royal Navy, which could select their recruits, 
the Army had to accept anyone deemed medically fit enough. In 
1939, the Army Council agreed to experiment with intelligence 
testing so as to ensure that technical and fighting staff were capa-
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ble. Psychiatrists conducting their own experiments had obtained 
promising results, and an advisory committee was appointed, one 
of whose members was Myers, expanding his influence beyond the 
Navy and working in affiliation with the Tavistock once more. As a 
result of their recommendations, the Army Directorate for Selection 
of Personnel (DSP) was created in 1941, with widespread selec-
tion testing for all recruits being implemented through the General 
Service Scheme in summer 1942. In early 1941, unofficial exper-
iments in officer selection were carried out in Edinburgh by the 
Tavistock staff. They proved particularly adept at infiltrating the 
bodies which governed the application of selection science, man-
aging to secure support for their new methods of officer selection 
from the General Officer Commanding, Sir Andrew Thorne (who 
had been berated by army colleagues as being ‘bloody Freud of 
the British Army!’ for suggesting the use of scientific selection), and 
the influential General Sir Ronald Adam. The psychoanalyst Adrian 
Stephen, brother of Virginia Woolf, noted that the Tavistock staff 
‘can teach us something in the way of practical psychology … in the 
tactful handling of negotiations’.38
By 1942, the public were baying for a change in how men were 
selected for commission and politicians were echoing their calls. It 
was considered that the more technical approach to war used by 
the Germans was beating the ‘old school tie’ method of govern-
ance used in Britain, which chose leaders based on whether they 
had attended schools in the Headmasters’ Conference.39 The press 
also noted the hypocrisy of fighting ‘for democracy’ with such an 
undemocratic Army leadership; arguments over how to govern the 
Army were representative of broader questions of how to govern 
a nation, or even the world.40 With all of this popular support for 
change, in 1942 the first experimental WOSBs were set up, and by 
autumn there were more than a dozen. The psychological approach 
was successful at fulfilling Ash’s criterion of expertise as being 
knowledge which enabled its patrons to take ‘action at a distance’; 
the principles developed enabled the establishment of boards on the 
same lines for the Auxiliary Territorial Service and troops abroad 
in the Middle East, India, Italy and Western Europe. By the end of 
war, ‘some 140,000 candidates had been through the new proce-
dure, of whom 60,000 passed’.41
Psychology was co-opted by the British government and the mil-
itary at a time of crisis, using science to combat problems seen as 
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being caused by modern science and technological warfare, and 
in order to shore up moral claims to a ‘good’ democratic form of 
governance. Military interest in scientific methods of governing the 
forces was contingent upon factors such as the course of the war and 
the public’s perception of military institutions. Yet it also arose as 
a result of practitioners foreseeing a need and seeking solutions to 
problems before they were officially raised, placing themselves in the 
natural position to enter the military organisational machine when 
eventually solutions were sought. It took different forms according 
to the specific different needs of the forces commissioning the col-
laboration and the involvement of individuals within those forces. 
These different forms were informed by the theories and practices of 
the scientists and their attitudes towards the organisation.
As with Navy selection, the selection staff were mainly auxil-
iary military personnel, but unlike in the Navy the scientists were 
not self-governing civilians, but located within the hierarchy of 
the Army, in the ambiguous space of medics in the Royal Army 
Medical Corps (RAMC), ‘mainly because it was thought that only 
a scheme run by soldiers would be acceptable to soldiers’.42 At the 
peak period there were nineteen psychologists (five women), thir-
ty-one officers with some training, and nearly 600 non-technical 
officers and 700 Non Commissioned Officers (of whom about 50 
and 200 respectively were women). The lack of scientific train-
ing in the governing ranks was specifically noted as problematic, 
because the low prestige of the scientists meant that ‘policies which 
they advocated as scientifically sound were often rejected, and the 
methods they devised were often misapplied and misinterpreted by 
insufficiently trained personnel’.43 Scientists complained that intelli-
gent teachers and graduates ‘were liable to be put on to cutting the 
grass’ at the whim of a Commissioned Officer, a clear suggestion 
that their technocratic view of how the Army should be governed 
was not coming to fruition.44 They concluded that:
Presumably the lesson to be drawn is that psychologists cannot 
expect a complex institution like the Army to accept novel pro-
cedures merely on scientific grounds, that gradual education and 
infiltration rather than the imposition of technically valid methods 
are needed.45
Because of their analytical focus, the psychiatrists working with the 
Army on the WOSBs saw the organisation itself as being disturbed; 
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they treated it as their ‘patient’ and the subject of their techniques of 
scientific management. As such, they sought to work more actively 
with it than the other psychologists had with their respective forces, 
in order to make the changes to selection something which came 
from within the Army itself:
It would have been possible to construct a scheme for officer selec-
tion in which psychologists and psychiatrists applied their methods 
to the problem while the Army made use of their results, but to do so 
would have been to introduce a ‘foreign body’ into the tissues of the 
Army which would have provoked an inevitable defense reaction.46
The psychological approach was therefore a more active compo-
nent in the choosing of Army officers, and aimed at a view of the 
man as a whole, rather than passively presenting objective data on 
skills that might make a man suitable. The General Service Scheme 
that applied basic intelligence and mechanical tests to all conscripts 
encountered few problems of military resistance, but the WOSBs 
were beset with conflict and renegotiation of the proper role of sci-
entists and science. Intelligence tests were also used in WOSBs, and 
much was made of the use of non-verbal tests to measure potential 
rather than what had been attained through education. Unlike in 
the RAF and Navy, some scores did rule out certain roles and elim-
inated men from being considered for officer training, excluding 
those who ‘would fall in the middle 40% of the general Army popu-
lation and would not therefore, be more intelligent than the average 
“other rank” soldier’.47 The scientists made judgements about what 
a leader should be, and in the view of this highly educated group, 
those leading should be more intelligent than those they governed. 
Likewise, whilst the non-verbal intelligence tests were supposed to 
be blind to education and it was not supposed to matter whether a 
man had attended a public school, a preference was expressed for 
the university-educated man as more widely experienced.48
Other tests were designed ‘not so much to reveal officer traits 
(e.g. leadership) or abilities, as to bring out the candidates’ social 
reactions under conditions of strain’.49 They included word asso-
ciation, which was used in order to suggest attitudes to others, 
and anxiety or inner conflict where very short answers or blanks 
occurred, and Murray’s Thematic Apperception Test, which was 
used to explore unconscious relations to others by getting can-
didates to describe what was happening in a picture. The most 
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vaunted test developed for WOSBs was the leaderless group test, 
where candidates were put in groups without allocated leaders and 
had to complete a task, thus exposing tensions between wanting to 
do well for oneself and wanting to succeed as a group, and demon-
strating the ability of men to manage these tensions. It was consid-
ered that the task itself, such as building a bridge, was a disguise 
for the real psychiatric purpose of the test: observing interaction 
between men. It may be noted that, unlike the tests used with the 
RAF and Navy, the outputs of these tests were not quantitative 
but qualitative. Results were graded on the ‘GABI’ scale, but this 
technical name belied a straightforward rating of ‘good, average, 
borderline, inadequate’. The other psychologists were critical of the 
methodology, but not of the results: ‘whether their methods were 
entirely technically sound or not – they won the confidence of the 
Army and stimulated a continuous flow of good material’.50
Although this approach initially won confidence, problems arose, 
from the psychiatrists’ perspective, from army staff’s beginning to 
act the ‘amateur psychiatrist’; they struggled to defend the bound-
aries of their profession from those who thought that they were 
equally able to interpret the results of the tests. Similarly, some mil-
itary men ‘found it difficult to accept that an apparently competent 
man would be rated too low in the intelligence tests for the arm 
of his choice or when some psychiatric features were uncovered 
which cast doubts on the man’s stability despite an apparently good 
impression’.51 Psychological science faced particular challenges 
with regard to governance; on the one hand, this science was seen 
as such common sense that a layman with no training might be 
able to do it, and on the other hand, it was so bound up in theories 
that the scientifically untrained could not fathom its conclusions. 
In focusing to such a large extent on the social rather than ‘skills’ 
or reactions to physical stimuli, the psychiatrists were vulnerable 
to the imposition of outsiders who had their own perceptions of 
what was being measured. In addition, they were actively involved 
in decision making. They therefore could be construed as a threat 
to some members of the Army, who saw them as ‘dominating 
the selection procedure by virtue of their technical knowledge and 
ability to present evidence’, threatening traditional authority with 
scientific authority.52
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Conclusion
At the beginning of the Second World War, psychological science 
claimed expertise relevant to governance of the armed forces, based 
upon a comprehension of underlying processes in leadership and the-
ories distilled from this. Each institution aimed to establish the legit-
imacy of its science as a way of rendering human character visible, 
quantifiable and thus governable, and often pursued similar methods 
of achieving this legitimation, such as publications and links with 
scholarly societies and government committees. Pre-war concepts 
about how science should work in relation to an organisation carried 
over into the military collaborations of the Second World War, shap-
ing the psychologists’ view of the objects of their science, as well as 
how they themselves fitted into structures of governance. The more 
closely the psychological approach was engaged with the object of 
study, the more active the governing role they sought to negotiate for 
themselves with the military during war. The Cambridge psycholo-
gists continued to experiment and produce data, focusing on pro-
ducing general principles of their science, with little concern about 
its application by those who paid for it. The NIIP acted as it had as 
industry consultants, offering tests to govern and methods of easing 
their acceptance by those to whom they were applied, although ulti-
mately not making judgements about what form governance should 
take. The Tavistock, by contrast, viewed the organisation itself as a 
poorly functioning organism, and sought to work with it as a psy-
chiatrist would with a patient in order that it should recognise its 
failings and implement more long-term improvements.
By establishing the operative nature of their work, psycholo-
gists built their expertise over the course of the war. After the war 
ended, the Tavistock group was able to codify its expert status, 
establishing the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations to continue 
work in this field. This organisation found employment in both 
private and newly nationalised industry, and increasingly found 
legitimation through publication and academic links. The war had 
also opened up new avenues for the experimental psychologists at 
Cambridge. In 1944, an Applied Psychology Unit was established 
at Cambridge, and Bartlett embarked upon ‘a line of investiga-
tion on complex human abilities’, which some consider to be his 
‘most outstanding’ work, culminating in his monograph, Thinking 
(1958).53 Myers passed away shortly after the end of the war, but 
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the NIIP  continued in its work. In the 1950s, under the director-
ship of C.B. Frisby, the NIIP shifted its focus from practical appli-
cation to science, for instance by seeking status as an industrial 
research association in order to ‘encourage and develop the science 
of industrial and Occupational Psychology’.54 This organisation 
would expand further in the 1960s, with support from the Ministry 
of Technology. Beyond these institutions, however, the role of 
psychological expertise in governance had been established more 
generally during the war years; in 1950, the civil service category 
of ‘Psychologist’ was established, integrating psychological knowl-
edge into the formal governance of Britain. Ironically, applicants 
were not required to undergo a rigorous selection process.55
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